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When G. Stanley Hall (1904) wrote the first book on adolescence at 
the turn of the 20th century, he was describing a new cultural phe-
nomenon that had emerged in the United States and other industri-
alizing societies during the late 19th century. There had always been 
children, whether or not we theorized about them, but there had not 
always been adolescents. 
Of course, there have always been teenagers in the mathematical 
sense of persons who have reached the age of 13 years but not yet 
20 years (and in the linguistic sense that these are the ‘‘teen’’ years 
in our counting scheme). But in most societies and cultural tradi-
tions teenagers were not a distinguishable group. Depending on gen-
der they might be expected to work, marry, have children, or run a 
household. The Jewish Bar Mitzvah at age 13, for example, has for 
centuries marked entry into the adult community with full rights 
and responsibilities. Romeo’s Juliet was just 13 years old. Teens were 
young adults for most of history; there was no special category of 
teenagers or adolescents. 
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Now that adolescents have been around for more than a century, 
however, we think they have been here forever. In fact, we theorize 
about them as if adolescence were a natural biological phenomenon associ-
ated with the teen years, and as if the psychological phenomena of adoles-
cence were the predictable result of teen brains. 
Our thinking about adolescents, I suggest, is deeply flawed. In this guest 
editorial, expanding on previous publications (Moshman, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011c), I identify five fallacies. 
Categorical misclassification 
Teenagers (ages 13–19) are categorically different from young children but 
not from older individuals. Teens routinely show forms and levels of knowl-
edge and reasoning rarely or never seen before the age of 10 or 11. Like 
adults, but unlike children, those we call ‘‘adolescents’’ often engage in hy-
pothetico-deductive reasoning, dialectical reasoning, and reflective coordi-
nations of theories and evidence. They show explicit conceptions of inferen-
tial validity and reflective epistemologies. In social and moral contexts they 
apply third-party perspective taking and principled reasoning. Many con-
struct personal identities (Moshman, 2011a; see also Kuhn, 2009). 
There is no comparable list, to my knowledge, of abilities common among 
older individuals but rare in young teens. Anything most adults can do, most 
teens can do too. Development beyond the age of about 12 is far too subtle 
and individualized to divide people into categories on the basis of age. 
It is thus a misclassification to categorize adolescents with children (as 
‘‘minors’’ or ‘‘mere children’’). There is, moreover, no reason to see them as 
constituting a distinct category between children and adults. There is simply 
no empirical basis for categorically distinguishing adolescents from adults. 
Alleged irrationalities 
Regardless of the evidence for adolescent competence, allegations of ado-
lescent irrationality never end. In the latter third of the 20th century, a fa-
vored concept was ‘‘adolescent egocentrism,’’ which was taken to include 
uniquely adolescent tendencies to construct a ‘‘personal fable’’ of oneself 
and assume an ‘‘imaginary audience’’ especially concerned with that self. 
For decades after Elkind’s (1967) theoretical analysis of egocentrism in re-
lation to Piaget’s stage of formal operations, it was popular to talk of ‘‘ad-
olescent egocentrism’’ as if there were some special kind or extent of ego-
centrism associated with adolescence. Substantial research, however, has 
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failed to show the age trends predicted by Elkind’s theoretical claims (Mill-
stein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002; Quadrel, Fischhoff,&Davis, 1993; Smetana & 
Villalobos, 2009). We are all egocentric in various ways and to various de-
grees. The egocentrism of adolescents is nothing special. 
Today the latest concern is ‘‘adolescent risk taking,’’ which is taken to 
be a bad thing special to adolescents. It is often rational to take risks, how-
ever, and adolescence is a period of life when this is surely so. Do adoles-
cents have a special propensity, rarely seen in children or adults, to take ir-
rational risks? On the contrary, adolescents take the same sorts of risks as 
adults and show the same rational and irrational tendencies common to hu-
man functioning. There is no empirical basis for distinguishing adolescents 
from adults with respect to risk taking. 
Of course many adolescents repeatedly engage in behaviors (often involv-
ing drugs or sex) that many adults find objectionable, but many adults also 
engage in the same behaviors. There is no standard of rational risk taking 
that is generally met by adults but rarely by adolescents (Moshman, 2011a). 
Beyond about age 12, individual differences in how open we are to taking 
risks and how rational we are in assessing risk have little or no relation to 
age. Other factors such as poverty may be more strongly related to the pro-
pensity to take risks and the types of risks taken (Males, 2009, 2010a). 
Are adolescents irrational? The evidence is clear that they often fall short 
of logical and other standards of rationality and that they are highly sub-
ject to emotional biases, cognitive distortions, self-serving denial, and peer 
pressure. But, adults are irrational in all the same ways and, on average, to 
about the same extent. Beyond about age 12, age does not predict rationality. 
False charges of immaturity 
Children of any age up to 12 are demonstrably more mature than children 
three years younger than themselves. The literature of developmental psy-
chology provides many examples of competencies routinely seen among, 
say, 6-year-olds that are rare among 3-year-olds. And, even 9-year-olds are 
lacking a variety of competencies most of them will show by the age of 
12. But, there is no evidence of any form or level of competence common 
among adults beyond some age but rare in young teens. Quite the contrary, 
on any measure of competence, rationality, or psychological functioning, 
many 14-yearolds perform beyond the level of many 40-year-olds (Mosh-
man, 2011a). 
In recent years, terms such as ‘‘executive function’’ and ‘‘executive con-
trol’’ have been used to refer to higherorder forms of information process-
ing involving metacognitive self-regulation. But children, it is important 
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to emphasize, show executive function and control from early ages. Young 
teens have attained levels not seen in early childhood but individual differ-
ences beyond early adolescence show little or no relation to age. There is no 
adult level of executive function or control that adolescents have yet to at-
tain (Spear, 2010). 
This is not to say there is no development beyond age 12. Quite the con-
trary, developmental progress in reasoning, rationality, morality, and identity 
over the teen years and beyond is common (Moshman, 2011a). But, develop-
ment beyond age 12 is highly individualized. Adolescents develop to varying 
degrees in diverse domains and cultural contexts. Individual differences be-
yond age 12 are substantial, but age accounts for very little of the variance. 
Reductionism 
Brain science has become increasingly popular since the 1990s, and this is 
especially true of research on adolescent brains (e.g., Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 
2008; Spear, 2010). The potential value of such research is obvious. But in-
terpretations of results, especially in the popular press, have tended to re-
duce psychology to neurobiology. The brain is presented as if it causes (and 
thus explains) behavior. We are, in the reductionist view, our brains. 
However, we are more than our brains, and what we do is not simply done 
by our brains. We are complex, self-regulating organisms interacting 
with other such organisms in complex and changing environments. 
More generally, wholes are greater than the sums of their parts. Brains 
are more than neurons or genes and people are more than brains. 
Reductionism is arguably a fallacy in principle (Gottlieb, Wahl-
sten, & Lickliter, 2006; Hood, Halpern, Greenberg, & Lerner, 2010; 
Overton, 2006, 2010). As we move from physics to chemistry to biol-
ogy to psychology to sociology, new phenomena emerge that require 
new forms of explanation. Combinations of atoms generate chemical 
phenomena that are consistent with the laws of physics but cannot 
be fully explained by the physics of atoms. As the chemistry of car-
bon moves into the realm of biochemistry it yields phenomena of life 
that, without defying the laws of chemistry, sufficiently transcend 
them to require new, biological forms of explanation. The behavior of 
organisms, in turn, is entirely biological, but requires psychological 
explanation in terms of individual agency and information process-
ing. Psychological phenomena cannot be reduced to the anatomy and 
physiology of brains. 
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Even if reduction were possible in principle, moreover, we are a 
long way from achieving it in fact. The behavior of diverse organisms 
in diverse environmental contexts cannot be predicted accurately from 
knowledge of biology and context. The potential interactions of var-
ious biological and contextual factors are far beyond our knowledge 
and likely beyond human comprehension. In particular, we know far 
too little about the relation of brain to behavior to explain the latter 
by the former. 
One especially disturbing recent trend is the tendency to reduce so-
ciology directly to neurobiology, bypassing psychology entirely. Brain 
explanations of risk taking fall in this category in that they seek a bi-
ological explanation for a vaguely conceptualized social phenomenon 
that has little psychological reality. At the psychological level, as we 
have seen, there is no such thing as ‘‘adolescent risk taking’’ except in 
the trivial sense that adolescents, like children and adults, take a vari-
ety of risks, sometimes wisely and sometimes not. However, regard-
less of the psychological evidence, adolescent risk taking is seen as a 
social and cultural problem that needs to be addressed. If we cannot 
find anything uniquely wrong in adolescent minds, we look to their 
brains. 
Determinism 
Determinism, which is closely related to reductionism, explains the 
current state of a developing or developed organism as caused by 
genes, culture, or some other specific factor, thus either denying the 
developmental process or attributing development to the direct causal 
effect of that factor. Forces beyond our control change our brains, a 
determinist would argue, and thus change us. We become whatever 
our brains become when they get changed. 
Determinism is rejected by most developmentalists (Hood et al., 
2010; Overton, 2006, 2010; Paus, 2009), especially proponents of 
constructivism (Mu¨ ller, Carpendale, & Smith, 2009), dynamic sys-
tems (Witherington, 2007, 2011), and relational developmental sys-
tems (Gottlieb et al., 2006; Lerner, 2006; Overton, 2010). In particu-
lar, extensive research has disconfirmed deterministic views in which 
genes cause brain maturation which, in turn, causes the emergence of 
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new cognitive abilities or levels of functioning. In general, it is equally 
plausible that adolescent activities and experiences cause cognitive 
progress which, in turn, causes positive changes in the structure and 
functioning of the brain (Paus, 2009). 
We need not ask, however, whether brain changes are caused by 
genes, environments, or mental actions. To concern ourselves with 
what causes what, in what order, would invoke the physical causal-
ity of billiard balls. The developmental causality of biological organ-
isms has been variously described as bidirectional, relational, recip-
rocal, circular, co-active, and pluralistic. The brain is part of a larger 
self-regulating biological system that in turn plays an active role in 
a social and physical environment. We transform our brains and our 
environments even as they transform us. Development cannot be un-
derstood as a simple succession of causes and effects. 
Determinism is seen by many as scientific in its reductionism. Re-
ductionist explanations, however, rely on simple forms of causality 
that cannot explain developing biological and psychological structures 
and processes (Witherington, 2011). The adolescent brain has great 
potential, but it cannot depend on genes to generate development. 
Conclusion 
The evidence to support a view of adolescents as young adults is sub-
stantial. Conceptualizations of adolescents that highlight their ratio-
nal agency and competence come from many quarters (Barber, 2009; 
Benson, 2008; Daiute, 2010; Damon, 2008; Epstein, 2010; Hammack, 
2011; Hine, 1999; Kuhn, 2009; Lerner, 2004, 2007; Levesque, 2000, 
2007; Males, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Macleod, 2011; Millstein & Halp-
ern-Felsher, 2002; Moshman, 1993, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Nichols & 
Good, 2004; Quadrel et al., 1993; Sercombe, 2010; Sherrod, Torney-
Purta, & Flanagan, 2010; Smetana, 2011; Smetana & Villalobos, 2009; 
Umeh, 2009). 
To see adolescents instead as irrational brains on the road to ra-
tional maturity is to succumb to all the fallacies discussed previously. 
Adolescents are rational agents interacting with each other and with 
their environments and constructing their own futures. They cannot 
do this without their brains, but they are constructing their brains, 
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not simply being driven by them. Adolescents may indeed develop, 
but their development is not caused by their brains. Adolescents may 
become more rational, but there is no universal or biological state of 
maturity waiting to be reached. 
Adolescents are, in other words, young adults. They may have 
greater developmental potential than older adults, but the possibility 
of developmental change does not end with adolescence and does not 
make adolescents children. Adolescents, like adults but unlike chil-
dren, may or may not develop, depending in part on their circum-
stances. The challenge for research is to understand what potentially 
develops beyond childhood and how. The challenge for practice is to 
promote such development where we can. 
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